Appellate Remittitur by Kinder, Richard
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 33 




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Kinder, Appellate Remittitur, 33 MO. L. REV. (1968) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





The power of the trial court to reduce an excessive verdict has long been con-
clusively established both in Missouri and the federal courts.' This discussion is
limited to the practice of remittitur by appellate courts. When an appellate court
remits an excessive judgment it does not set aside the lower court judgment and
enter judgment for a lesser amount. Instead the court conditions its affirmance on
the plaintiff consenting to remit that amount by which the judgment in his favor
is deemed excessive. If he does not consent, the judgment of the lower court is re-
versed and the case is remanded for a new trial. Appellate remittitur has the ob-
vious advantage of avoiding the delay and expense usually inherent in a new trial.
Nevertheless, the procedure has not been universally accepted and its opponents
have consistently argued that it violates state and federal constitutional provisions.
II. APPELLATE REMrrrrrUR IN MIssouRI
The earliest Missouri cases sanctioning the use of appellate remittitur involved
voluntary remissions by the plaintiff. In some cases2 the plaintiff would anticipate,
and avoid, reversal of an excessive judgment by offering to remit a specific portion
of that judgment before arguments in the appellate court. In other cases the plain-
tiff would attempt, sometimes unsuccessfully, to avoid remand by asking the su-
preme court to determine the amount by which a judgment was excessive, agreeing
in his argument before that court to remit that amount.3 The defendant's response
to either of these approaches was invariably to argue that the appellate court had
no power to reduce the judgment and that a new trial was required. This process
1. Missouri: See, e.g., Dale v. St. Louis, K.C. & N. Ry., 63 Mo. 455, 460
(1867); Loyd v. Hannibal & St. J. R.R., 53 Mo. 509, 514 (1873). Federal courts:
Blunt v. Little, 3 Fed. Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) was the first
decision to uphold the use of remittitur by a federal trial court. The Supreme Court
adopted the same view in Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 646-47
(1885), and reiterated it, with little attempt at constitutional justification, suc-
cessively in Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 73 (1889); Kennon v.
Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29 (1889); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co.,
158 U.S. 41, 52 (1895); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307, 312
(1911); Gila Valley G. & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 103-05 (1914). A reasoned
judicial sanction for trial court remittitur was finally supplied in Demick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 483 (1935).
2. See, e.g., Smith v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry., 92 Mo. 359, 4 S.W. 129
(1887); Waldhier v. Hannibal & St. J. R.R., 87 Mo. 37 (1885).
3. See, e.g., Gurley v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 104 Mo. 211, 16 S.W. 11 (1891).
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of voluntary remittitur soon led appellate courts to reduce excessive verdicts even
in situations where the plaintiff had not consented in advance to remit a certain
portion. This is usually termed enforced remittitur.
In 1890 the Missouri Supreme Court held in Furnisk v. Missouri Pac. R.R.4
that it could remit an excessive judgment even though the plaintiff had not con-
sented to remit any sum. This case represents the first clear endorsement of en-
forced remittitur by our supreme court. Two decades and several conflicting opinions
were to transpire before the practice became conclusively established. In 1891
division two of the supreme court held that it had no power to reduce a judgment
by remittitur.5 In 1894 the supreme court reversed itself in Burdict v. Mo. Pac.
R.R.,G and decided en banc that it had the power to remit an excessive judgment.
In two separate and lengthy opinions, three dissenting judges argued that enforced
remittitur violated the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury and that the
appellate court by reviewing the amount of unliquidated damages awarded, was
involving itself in the determination of a factual question which historically was
reserved to the trial court.
The views of the dissenters prevailed in the next case involving remittitur.
In Rodney v. St. Louis S.W. Ry.,7 Division One, relying upon the decision in
Burdict, entered a remittitur. The case was transferred to the court en banc, and
by a four to three vote, the Missouri Supreme Court decided it had no power to
remit 8 In 1897 division two followed the decision in Rodney by reiterating, in
Hollenbeck v. Mo. Pac. R.R.,9 that appellate courts have no power to remit.
Hollenbeck was the last Missouri decision denying the power to remit. Division
one, beginning with its decision in Chitty v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry.,' 0 has con-
sistently held that the supreme court could reduce an excessive judgment.11
Division two, in Pkippin v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,12 likewise upheld the power of
remittitur in the supreme court.
Authority for appellate remittitur was conclusively established in the decision
of the Supreme Court En Banc in Cook v. Globe Printing Co.13 Plaintiff had
sued a St. Louis newspaper for libel. The jury verdict was for $75,000 actual and
$75,000 punitive damages, and the lower court entered judgment thereon. The
supreme court, citing the more recent decisions in both divisions, decided that the
4. 102 Mo. 438, 13 S.W. 1044 (1890).
5. Gurley v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 104 Mo. 211, 16 S.W. 11 (1891).
6. 123 Mo. 221, 27 S.W. 453 (En Banc 1894).
7. 127 Mo. 676, 28 S.W. 887 (1894).
8. 127 Mo. 676, 30 S.W. 150 (En Banc 1895).
9. 141 Mo. 97, 38 S.W. 723 (1897).
10. 148 Mo. 64, 49 S.W. 868 (1899). The court did not actually order a
remittitur, since it believed the excessiveness in this case was the result of the
passion and prejudice of the jury, and hence could not be cured by a remittitur at
the appellate level.
11. Devoy v. St. Louis Transit Co., 192 Mo. 197, 91 S.W. 140 (1905);
Reynolds v. St. Louis Transit Co., 189 Mo. 408, 88 S.W. 50 (1905).
12. 196 Mo. 321, 93 S.W. 410 (1905).
13. 227 Mo. 471, 127 S.W. 332 (En Banc 1910).
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practice of appellate remittitur had become established, that such procedure was
within the power of the court, and reduced the judgment to $25,000 actual and
$25,000 punitive damages. Since Cook, decisions of Missouri courts have upheld
appellate remittitur without exception.14
Since the earliest remittitur cases in Missouri, the practice of appellate remit-
titur has been attacked primarily on two grounds. The most frequent contention
of those opposing it is that it violates the plaintiff's right to trial by jury. Article
II Section 28 of the 1875 Missouri Constitution guaranteed this right and Article
I Section 22(a) of the 1945 constitution is identical. The 1875 constitution was in
effect when the Missouri Supreme Court rendered the series of decisions, culminat-
ing in Cook v. Globe Printing Co.,15 which first sanctioned appellate remittitur.
All of these decisions upholding the use of remittitur impliedly rejected the argu-
ment that such process violated the constitutional right to a trial by jury, and in
Chitty'6 the court expressly held that Article II Section 28 was not violated. The
equivalent provision of the 1945 Constitution (Article I Section 22(a)) provides
"that the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate." It has
been argued that since appellate remittitur was an established practice before the
adoption of the 1945 Constitution, "the right of trial by jury 'as heretofore en-
joyed' . . . is subject to the condition that an appellate court can remit an excessive
judgment."17
There is much logic in holding that the plaintiff is not denied his right to a
jury trial because the essence of remittitur is the choice offered the plaintiff-he
can either consent to a judgment for the reduced amount or have a new trial
before a different jury.
The second primary argument against remittitur is that an appellate court,
by reducing the size of an excessive judgment, is reviewing a finding of fact by the
lower court. No constitutional provision prohibits an appellate court from review-
ing questions of fact,'8 but Missouri courts have often expressed the view that an
appellate court ought not, as a matter of policy, interfere with the determination of
facts made by the trial court.19 The procedure of appellate remittitur, however,
is not a reexamination of factual issues determined by the jury or trial court,
because an appellate court will remit an excessive judgment only when that is the
sole error shown by the record 20 Furthermore, the amount of the judgment will
14. Smiley v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 359 Mo. 474, 484, 222 S.W.2d 481, 486(En Banc 1949). See Coburn, The Missouri Remittitur Practice, 1958 Mo. BAR J.
214, 215-16, for an excellent discussion of the development of appellate remittitur in
Missouri.
15. 227 Mo. 471, 127 S.W. 332 (En Banc 1910).
16. 148 Mo. 64, 49 S.W. 868 (1899).
17. Coburn, The Missouri Remittitur Practice, 1958 Mo. BAR J. 214, 217.
18. Smith v. Baer, 166 Mo. 392, 406, 66 S.W. 166, 170 (1901).
19. See, e.g., Widener v. St. Louis Piib. Serv. Co.. 360 Mo. 761. 766, 230
S.W.2d 698, 700 (1950); King v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 75, 88, 164
S.W.2d 458, 465 (En Banc 1942).
20. Olian v. Olian, 332 Mo. 689, 700-01, 59 S.W.2d 673, 678 (1933).
1968]
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be reviewed only "as a question of law presented on the cold record," 21 and the
court will interfere only if there is not substantial evidence to support the award.22
Thus the appellate court is merely applying the same standards to the issue of
damages which it applies to the issue of liability when determining, as a matter of
law, whether a submissible case has been made.
Even though Missouri courts accept appellate remittitur without qualification,
they apply it only in limited situations. Missouri decisions state that the amount
of damages is not to be interfered with by an appellate court unless the award
is "so large as to offend against all sense of right,"23 or "shockingly excessive," 24
or "is shocking to the judicial conscience." 25
Appellate courts are especially reluctant to order a further reduction of the
award if the trial court has considered the matter and already reduced the amount
substantially.20
In determining whether the judgment is so excessive as to warrant appellate
remittitur, the courts will consider each case on its own facts.27 Such factors as
changing economic conditions and reduced purchasing power of the dollar will also
be weighed in the determination.28 The court will also consider the size of verdicts
rendered in similar cases with a view toward maintaining "reasonable uniformity of
awards for similar injuries." 29 This rule of uniformity is based on the supposition
that the amounts awarded, by juries will vary greatly, because they are in no
position to compare the verdicts they render to those in similar cases. The courts,
however, are able to contrast the verdict in a particular case with those handed
down by juries in similar cases, and thus equalize the results.ao
A court which has decided to reduce an excessive judgment must determine
21. Riley v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 245 S.W.2d 666, 674 (St. L. Mo. App.
1952).
22. Daniels v. Brown, 266 S.W.2d 680, 688 (Mo. 1954).
23. Mollman v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 192 S.W.2d 618, 626 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1946). See also Silsby v. Hinckey, 107 S.W.2d 812, 819 (St. L. Mo. App.
1937).
24. Marshall v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 196 S.W.2d 435, 437 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1946).
25. Ibid.
26. See, e.g., Cruce v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R. Co., 361 Mo. 1138, 238 S.W.2d
674 (1951); Cook v. Kansas City, 358 Mo. 296, 214 S.W.2d 430 (1948); Orr v.
Shell Oil Co., 352 Mo. 288, 177 S.W.2d 608 (1943); Shaefer v. Transamerican
Freight Lines, 173 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1943); Gieseking v. Litchfield & M. Ry., 344
Mo. 672, 127 S.W.2d 700 (1939).
27. Berry v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 357 Mo. 808, 823, 211
S.W.2d 35, 44 (1948); Burris v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 226 S.W.2d 743, 752
(K.C. Mo. App. 1950).
28. Williamson v. Wabash R.R. Co., 355 Mo. 248, 256, 196 S.W.2d 129, 134(1946); Clader v. City of Neosho, 198 S.W.2d 523, 530 (Spr. Mo. App. 1946).
29. Berry v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Drygoods Co., 357 Mo. 808, 823, 211
S.W.2d 35, 44 (1948). See also Sanders v. Illinois Central R.R., 364 Mo. 1010, 270
S.W.2d 731 (En Banc 1954).
30. The fault in this reasoning is that Missouri courts have thus far been
generally unwilling to apply the procedure of additur which would raise to the
"standard of uniformity" those judgments which are regarded as inadequate.
[Vol. 33
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what amount to remit. Three different approaches have been suggested. Wisconsin
courts have adopted the standard that the amount remitted should reduce the
judgment to the lowest amount the jury could reasonably have found as its ver-
dict.31 The apparent rationale for this theory is that courts should give the fore-
most consideration to the interest of the defendant, since he has no alternative but
to accept the remitted verdict; whereas the plaintiff if not satisfied can choose to
submit to a new trial. The Missouri Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Wisconsin
view in Clark v. Atchison & E. Bridge Co.32 The defendant had urged the court
to fix the amount of the reduced judgment at the "minimum which the evidence
would justify,"33 since the plaintiff is not forced to accept the remittitur while the
defendant has no choice except to pay the amount left after the remittitur. The
court rejected the defendant's reasoning:
... [the defendant's] argument loses sight of the fact that it is the
defendant who is seeking relief from the alleged excessive verdict, and that
a remittitur is allowed only in cases where the defendant has already had
a fair and impartial trial, free from error and, the plaintiff is entitled to the
affirmance of the entire verdict and judgment except to the extent the
judgment is shown to be excessive.34
Other courts have adopted an approach which is the antithesis of the Wis-
consin view. Their decisions hold that the excessive judgment should be reduced
only to the maximum which the court can uphold as not excessive.3 5 The theory
is that the jury intended to award the plaintiff as much as is legally permissible,
and that for an appellate court to reduce the amount below that point would
constitute an invasion of the jury's province.
The majority of state and federal courts have adopted neither standard, ap-
parently preferring to set the amount of the reduced judgment at a sum which the
court believes a properly functioning jury would have found.36 Although the
Missouri Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted this intermediate approach,
the language of recent decisions supports this view. In Crane v. Nortlu4p,3" the
31. Swanson v. Schultz, 223 Wis. 278, 270 N.W. 43 (1936); Reykdal v.
Miller, 216 Wis. 561, 257 N.W. 604 (1934); Lehner v. Kelley, 215 Wis. 265, 254
N.W. 634 (1934).
32. 333 Mo. 721, 62 S.W.2d 1079 (1933).
33. Id. at 732, 62 S.W.2d at 1083.
34. Id. at 732, 62 S.W.2d at 1083-84.
35. At least three federal courts of appeals have adopted this view. See, e.g.,
Covey Gas & Oil Co. v. Checketts, 187 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1951); Boyle v. Bond,
187 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1951), Texas Co. v. Christian, 177 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.
1949).
36. 6A MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.05[3] (2d ed. 1953). Although many
of the decisions asserting this approach have been concerned with remittitur in the
trial court, see, e.g., Fornwalt v. Reading Co., 79 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa. 1948);
Grobengieser v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 94 F. Supp. 402, 405 (W.D. Pa. 1950), the
same general rules apply to both trial and appellate remittitur. 6A MooRE, FEDEP_4.
PRAcTIcE § 59.05[3 (2d ed. 1953).
37. 413 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1967). See also Parlow v. Carson-Union-May-Stem
Co., 310 S.W.2d 877, 885 (Mo. 1958).
1968]
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court declared that "the ultimate test of excessiveness or of inadequacy of an award
is what will fairly and reasonably compensate for the injuries sustained."3 8
This approach appears just and feasible. Defendant profits from the court's
experienced judgment as to what award is adequate and yet entirely fair. The
plaintiff, while preserving his option to refuse, is given an incentive to accept the
remittitur, thus avoiding the delay and expense of a new trial. Any other approach
places one of the parties at a severe disadvantage. If the court fixes as the reduced
judgment the lowest amount that the jury could reasonably find, it has intruded
considerably into the jury's function. More importantly, the plaintiff's incentive
to accept the remittitur is virtually nil.
If the court espouses the antithetical view and remits only that portion of
the judgment which is beyond the maximum recovery legally permissible, the plain-
tiff is provided with a strong incentive to remit; but the defendant, who has no
option, is not benefited by the court's experienced determination as to what amount
a jury would have found if functioning properly.
III. APPELLATE REMITrrrTUR IN THE FEDERAL CouRTs
The Missouri procedure of appellate remittitur is not followed by the federal
courts sitting in this state. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has declared that
"the assignment of error that the verdict is excessive is not properly addressed to
this court."30 As support for its position the court has referred to the Seventh
Amendment of the United States Constituion and to the common law as it
existed in 1791 when that amendment was adopted.40
A number of recent decisions indicate that the excessiveness of the judgment
may be reviewed at the appellate level if there has been a "manifest abuse of
discretion," 41 or if the award is "so excessive as to be monstrous or to shock the
judicial conscience." 42 In Missouri K.T. R.R. v. Ridgeway,43 judgment was
reversed partially because the verdict was "so excessive as to shock the conscience"
and "not fairly supported by the evidence." 44 Despite these intimations, it is safe
to say that the Eighth Circuit will review a judgment on the ground of excessiveness
38. 413 S.W.2d at 194.
39. New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Affolder, 174 F.2d 486, 493 (8th Cir. 1949),
rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 96 (1950). See also Railway Express Agency v.
Epperson, 240 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1957); National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Mill Co.
v. Sorensen, 220 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1955); Glendenning Motorways v. Anderson,
213 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1954).
40. Myra Foundation v. United States, 267 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1959); Agnew-
v. Cox, 254 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1958).
41. Cutter v. Cincinnati Union Terminal Co., 361 F.2d 637, 639 (8th Cir.
1966); Boston & M. R.R. v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir. 1966); Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez Rivera, 358 F.2d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 1966).
42. Chicago, R. Is. & Pac. R.R. v. Williams, 245 F.2d 397, 406 (8th Cir.),.
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957). Louisville & N. R.R. v. Botts, 173 F.2d 164-
(8th Cir. 1949).
43. 191 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1951).
44. Id. at 368.
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only in very rare situations. Furthermore, when the court does find the judgment
so excessive as to warrant review, it is far more likely to reverse outright than
apply the doctrine of appellate remittitur.4 5
The United States Supreme Court has not directly decided this issue. Its de-
cisions indicate that a power to review exists46 under the statute creating appellate
powers in the federal courts of appeals,47 but the court has never determined
whether the Seventh Amendment precludes this type of appellate review "as a
'reexamination' of the 'facts' otherwise than 'according to the rules of the common
law.' "48 The Supreme Court has set apart this latter question for a later decision.49
Other federal courts of appeals have not agreed with the reasoning of the
Eighth Circuit. The discernible trend is toward greater review. Every other circuit
has decided that the excessiveness of a judgment is a proper basis for review.50
Many of the decisions upholding review have ignored the Seventh Amendment
issue.51
The federal courts of appeals have not always determined the applicability of
appellate review under the same formulas, but differences are more semantical than
fundamental. 52
45. See Missouri K.T.R.R. v. Ridgeway, 191 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1951). Also
those decisions merely intimating that reviewability is possible under some circum-
stances seem to speak in terms of reversal. See cases cited note 41 supra.
46. See, e.g., Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 339 U.S. 96 (1950);
Fairmount Glassworks v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1959) provides: "The Supreme Court or any other
court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse anyjudgment, decree or order of court lawfully brought before it for review, and may
remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree or
order or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the
circumstances."
48. Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961).
49. Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77, (1955).
50. First Circuit: Ballard v. Forbes, 208 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1954). Second
Circuit: Wicks v. Henken, 378 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1967); Lanfranconi v. Tidewater
Oil Co., 376 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1961); Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc. v. Richardson,
295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961); Dagnello v. Long Is. R.R., 389 F.2d 797 (2d Cir.
1961); Alexander v. Nash Kelvinator Corp., 271 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1959). Third
Circuit: Wooley v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 281 F.2d 78 (3rd Cir. 1960); Tebbs
v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 241 F.2d 276 (3rd Cir. 1957); Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co., 190
F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1951). Fourth Circuit: Virginia Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d
400 (4th Cir. 1948). Fifth Circuit: Silverman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 259
(5th Cir. 1960); Pheonix Indem. Co. v. Givens, 263 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1959);
Whiteman v. Pitrie, 224 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1955). Sixth Circuit: Flame Coal Co.
v. UMW, 303 F.2d 29 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 371 U.S. 891 (1962); Sebring Truck-
ing Co. v. White, 187 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1961); Consumers Power Co. v. Nash,
164 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1947). Seventh Circuit: Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576
(7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953). Ninth Circuit: Siebrand v.
Gossnell, 234 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1956); Baldwin v. Warwick, 213 F.2d 485 (9th
Cir. 1954); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951). D.C. Cir-
cuit: Hulett v. Brinson, 229 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Ball v. Bond, 187 F.2d
362 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
51. 6A MOORE, FEDERAL PRAacriCE § 59.08[61 (2d ed. 1953).
52. See Dagnello v. Long Is. R.R., 289 F.2d 797, 802 (2d Cir. 1961).
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When a federal court intervenes to correct an excessive judgment it usually
awards a new trial, but there are numerous cases where the actual process of ap-
pellate remittitur has been applied.53
IV. CONCLUSION
Remittitur can be a useful tool for appellate courts. In Missouri where the
general verdict is used and is almost immune from attack at the appellate level,
it seems particularly important that both trial and appellate courts have some
control over the size of the verdict.54
In any court, appellate remittitur is an indispensable aid in bringing litigation
to an early and expedient termination. It promotes the desirable goal of uniform
awards in similar cases. It does not represent an interference with the hallowed
right to a jury trial, nor does its use constitute appellate interference on factual
issues. Appellate remittitur should continue in use in those courts which presently
employ it, and be adopted by those few courts, like the Eighth Circuit, which do
not.
RIcAR KINDER
53. See, e.g., Wicks v. Henken, 378 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1967); Lanfranconi v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 376 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1967); Texas Co. v. Christian, 177 F.2d
759 (5th Cir. 1949); Flame Coal Co. v. UMW, 303 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962); Baldwin v. Warwick, 213 F.2d (9th Cir. 1954);
Covey Gas and Oil Co. v. Checketts, 187 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1951).
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